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PUBLISHERS NOTE

T

his year's BYU Prelaw Review editorial board has faced
enormous challenges. In spite of rime crunches, staff changes,
and delays in publication, we are happy to have produced the
fifteenth edition of che Review for prelaw students and law school
admissions officers in the U.S. and Canada.
For the first eight years of its existence, the R~view published
papers that were submitted co a course that I teach, Student Development 198R-Prelaw Seminar. Those papers were topical in narure,
based on the content of the course in a specific semester. Each semester
the topic rotates between constitutional, environmental, international,
criminal, and family law and the U.S. Supreme Court, taking three
years to complete the cycle.
In 1999 I decided to create a writing competition, similar to the
year-end experience that first-year students in law school have. The
1999-2000 topic was "Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital:
Dividing Assets at Dissolution of Marriage.: The 2000-2001 topic is
"Eiian Gonzalez: How Governments Impact Families." The 20012002 topic will be "Violence in America's Schools: Should Juveniles be
tried as Adults in the Criminal Justice System?"
Students have responded positively to the writing competition. The
number and quality of submissions have increased. Student editors
have expanded their editorial staff. This year for the first time,
a professional editorial board refereed the submissions to the Review.
The professional editorial board consists of professionals in prelaw,
legal, and legal education worlds. Their names are included here. We
greatly appreciate their service to the BYU Prelaw Review staff and the
writing competition participants.
The BYU Prelaw Review is one of my favorite parts of my job at
Brigham Young University as the Prelaw Advisor. In 1991 when I first
created the Revi~w. I never envisioned the evolution and ultimate
professionalism of the Review. I am indebted to the many student
editors over the years who have challenged themselves to improve on
past journals duough many, uncounted hours of service. Thanks to
each of them. We look forward to our continuing service to prelaw
students at BYU and hope that the BYU Prelaw Review will be a
fundamental part of their professional progression in the legal world.
Eileen Crane
Prelaw Advisor, BYU

EDITORS NOTE
mother, in an attempt to free herself and her son from an
oppressive regime nies to escape to a land of liberty. On the
way, the ship capsizes and only the young boy survives,
drifting at sea until he is fmally rescued by passing fishermen. After the
rescue of six-year-old Elian Gonzalez, a political tug-of-war ensues. His
case, a landmark in many branches of the law, matched Clinton against
Castro, Reno against Rodriguez, and freedom against the family."
The words of author Brock Lyle capture the essence of this almost
fairy tale story of a boy whose rapid ascent to fame brought to Light
many issues that caused a heated political battle unprecedented in
recent history. The legal implications and discussions of the events
surrounding the Elian Gonzalez case have and will continue to ripple
through the legal and political worlds. Was it really such a victory for
Cuba and Castro? Is U.S. policy really fair towards all? Questions have
been placed before us that are now commanding attention.. . immediate attention.
The Brigham Young University Prelaw Review has a tradition of
choosing a topic that is both germane and timely and inviting our
authors to share their academic thoughts on the subject. This is both in
an effort to help undergraduate students learn what it means to write
for a legal-style journal, but also, hopefully, to contribute through our
research and work, to the wealth and knowledge of the world of
academia that we have become a part of. In this issue, every article
discusses some aspect of the Elian Gonzalez case-the story of a boy
who was brought to the United States to escape a life of communism
and oppression, yet, due to the laws of this land, was returned to his
father in Cuba. There are many angles from which one could exan1ine
this case to find productive and informative arguments. Of all the
articles written, the ones appearing in this issue are, in our opinions,
the most informative. Although several of our authors have included
accounts of the proceedings that precipitated and then inflamed this
case, we would recommend that the reader make a thorough review of
the case from Elian's departure from Cuba with his mother, to
his return to Cuba and even the legal aftermath invotving Elian's
U.S. relatives.

A
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A law review for undergraduate students is rare. Forums such as
chis one are indeed important, to allow for the contribution of chose
who, while not yet trained specifically in law, have important ideas
worthy of contribution. Since this is such a rare endeavor there are
many to thank for their aid in bringing about this final project. Our
publisher, Eileen Crane, whose baby this journal is, has been and is a
tireless worker. She is able to direct and advise without an overbearance, and in this way has helped us to learn and grow as we
participate as equal partners. Linda Huncer Adams has acted as our
Production Advisor and has done more for this journal than anyone
else could have ever possibly done. Thanks are owed to a wonderful
staff of editors who are always striving for excellence, asking for
guidance where it is needed, and caking the initiative co handle whatever might arise. They have worked in a truly selfless team effort to
achieve success.
Finally, chis publication could not exist without the generous
financial sponsorship of people committed to student scholarship. We
offer our sincerest thanks to the following at Brigham Young University: Honors and General Education, The David M. Kennedy Center
for International Studies, and the Prelaw Advisement Center. We also
wish to thank several commercial entities for their continuing support
of our work. Brent Dunn, Founder and President of ACE LSAT Test
Preparation (www.acelsat.com) has proven himself as a person dedicated
to helping students excel, through organizations such as this journal and
also his LSAT Test Preparation courses that provide students with a
professional, well-developed, and affordable plan to achieve higher.
Kaplan Educational Centers (www.kaplan.com), world leaders in
standardized test preparation, provide many BYU students with
excellent training for the LSAT and other standardized tests. The BYU
Bookstore (www.byu.edu/bookstore) serves an important role in
helping BYU students prepare for law school, assisting them with
economically feasible ways to fulfill their personal computing and other
educational needs.
We hope you enjoy the articles in this issue.
Trent E. Christensen
Editor-in-Chief

FROM INTERNATIONAL lAW
To A M ADE -FOR-TV M oviE:
MEDIA INFLUENCE IN THE EuAN GONZALEZ STORY

JOHN BRAGONJE

Whm his r~lativ~s in Miami r4it1~d to mum him w his fothn- in Ct~ba,
tluir campaig71 wns fottght with photo ops and sound bites as much
as with the law. 1

E

veryone remembers powerful images the media propagates. The
media helps us stand in the crowd as Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., captivates the nation with his "I Have a Dream" speech in
front of the Washington Monument. Joe Rosenthal's well-known
photograph of U.S. Marines raising the American flag over Okinawa
engenders feelings of humble patriotism while reminding us of war's
terrible price. In one photograph, "Migrant Mother, Nipomo, California 1936," Dorothea Lang seems to capture not only the Depression's melancholy, but a mother's scoic determination as well. The
media's power co engrave images in our culcuraJ unconscious and co
prompt dialogue in our forums is so obvious chat it is undisputed.
People in America, Cuba, and much of the world, will remember
the still photo of a U.S. marshall taking a petrified Eli41n Gonzales from
his Miami relatives at gunpoint.2 This photo's ubiquiry demonstrates
the media's power to endow a complecely unknown and obscure sixyear-old wich international fame. Media artifice crafted the Elian
Gonzales case inco the cause celebre of the Cuban exile communiry, the
Clinton Administration, Castro's Cuba, and almost every American.
Noc only does this photo act as a silent epilogue co months of preceding media din, it demonstrates the media's pervasive influence and
direcr involvement in the Elian Gonzales case. Just as the media's figurative presence was felt throughout Elian's entire ordeal, the physical
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presence of photographer Alan Diaz during this winding-up raid
typifies media involvement in legal matters. The media unnecessarily
complicated the Elian case by covering, and thus legitimizing, legally
questionable claims that influenced public standards of justice. Though
both parties' claims were not equally legal, the media consistently
portrayed them as equivalents.
Parent Kidnapping: Pitting One Nation against Anoth er
In order to understand how the media interfered in a custody
dispute, one must understand the staturory scheme that frames this
international saga. Elian's mother's coming to the U.S. illegally and
without the knowledge of her ex-husband, who had partial custody of
the child, constitutes an international abduction, or pacem kidnapping.
As divorce rates burgeon, separated parents increasingly resort ro
vigilante kidnappings of their own children, hoping to retain custody
by moving from one nation to another. 3 These parents essentially pit
one nation's jurisdiction against another's. Even though the child's
native country wiU not award full custody, kidnapping parents hope
that a different nation will award permanent custody of the child.
The Hague Convention: G eneral Legal Procedures
for C hild Abduction
In order to stem the growing tide of parent kidnappings, international law-making bodies have drafted the H ague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This treaty forces
the abducting parent to return the child to the "country of habitual
residence," wh ere domestic jurisprudence can most effectively determine who should rightly retain custody of the child." The Hague Convention seeks to return kidnapped children as quickly as possible to
"pre-abduction status quo, where custody issues could be determined
according to the laws of that [nation's] forum ."5
The Hague Convention seems to resolve the plight of the Gonzales
family so clearly that those who observed the apparently endless
media morass may now question-if they had not before-how complications arose. There is a catch. In order for the Hague Convemion
to be binding, both the "home" state and the "foreign" state must sign
the treaty before the abduction takes place.6 Congress ratified the
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Hague Convention in 1988; Cuba, however, is not a signator of the
Convention, and therefore the Hague Convention did not apply in
Elian's case.7
Even though the Hague Convention played no concrete part in the
Elian case, I include this discussion for rwo reasons. First of all, U.S.
federal laws exactly parallel the Hague Convention. If a parent
kidnapping takes place within the U.S., the abducted child will be
returned to the state of habitual residence for custody hearings. The
H ague Convention reflects federal laws as well as international laws;
and consequently, observing the Elian case as an independent and
solitary example does not adequately portray what qualifies as a case of
political asyium. 8 Second, even though the Hague Convention did not
bind Cuba in this case, "international law has a strong basis for
returning Elian co his home in Cuba because his only surviving parent
lives in Cuba."q Hence, the Hague Convention characterizes the
nationally and internationally sanctioned jurisprudential momentum
regarding child abduction cases. In this abduction case, media-inflated
hopes of a naturalized Elian stand in stark contrast to universal legal
paradigms.

U.S. Immigration Law
Because Cuba is not party to the Hague Convention, the most
efficient, legal apparatus for returning abducted children was disabled,
but Elian's alien status activated an auxiliary statutory scheme. U.S. law
considered Elian an alien because of his Cuban citizenship, thus his
case fell under the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). Immigration law does not mandate that the INS
automatically deport illegal immigrants. Nevertheless, both Attorney
General Janet Reno and INS Commissioner Doris Meissner felt that
because of Elian's young age and his traumatic experience, the U.S.'s
"first responsibility ... when dealing with an unaccompanied minor
was to find the parent or legal guardian, even if the person was outside
the United States." 10

The Case for Elian's Naturalization
At this point, Senator Foreign Relations Chair Jesse Helms revealed
his plans to make Eli:in a U.S. citizen, an act that would have prevented
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Elian's reunion with Juan Miguel Gonzales, his father, in Cuba.
Additionally, Elian's Miami relatives filed a lawsuit against Attorney
General Reno and Commissioner Meissner seeking a political asylum
hearing to naturalize Elian. If granted political asylum, Elian would
have gained immediate resident status, whereas Cuban refugees
normally become citizens after residing in the U.S. for one year. 11 A
family division of a Florida state court awarded temporary custody of
Elian to his great uncle, Lazaro Gonzales. Nevertheless, federal
immigration laws trumped the court's ruling and the state circuit court
ultimately nullified the order granting Lazaro custody of Elian. 12 The
state court conceded that "Elian's ability to remain in the United States
was not a custodial matter to be decided by a state court but rather was
a federal immigration issue of whether he should stay in the United
States or be sent back to Cuba. " 13
Attorney General Reno truncated the aforementioned asylum
attempt by exercising her legal discretion to recognize Elian's father,
and not his great uncle, as guardian. Therefore, only Juan Miguel
Gonzales could legally apply for Elian's asylum, which of course
he did not. The Miami relatives appealed this decision in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta and finally in the U.S.
Supreme Court, which turned down the case. 14 Federal marshalls
ultimately took rhe boy by force and reunited him with his father,
on April 22, 2000. 1; The reunited family then returned to Cuba on
June 28, 2000. 16
The Plea for Asylum
The media covered Elian's case poorly, portraying the asylum
scenario as a viable option. Unaccompanied children's political asylum
rights are strictly limited under the Hague Convention, even when the
child's nation of habitual residence adheres to a very different political
ideology. According to the Hague Convention, the U.S. would need a
domestic law that expressly prohibits authorities from returning
children on U.S. soil to communist countries in order to prevent Elian's
return to Cuba on political grounds. 17 Even in terms of federal immigration law, applicants for political asylum must demonstrate "a wellfounded fear of political persecution." 18 Even the best asylum lawyers
would have snuggled with rhis task, given that by this time the Cuban
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media had already begun Eliin's apotheosis in ongoing anti-U.S.

d ••
propagan
· po1'ttl'cal 1'deo1ogtes
· cannot grant rest'dency
Even ta.hough dia::
rrenng
per se, age may. When a person reaches sixteen years of age, the Hague
Convention stipulations become null for that person. Six-year-old
Elian did not come close to this age standard upon arrival in the
United States.20 Immigration statutes do not specify a minimum age for
asylum seekers, but Michael Heyman of the University of Chicago's law
school summarizes the one major problem with young children's filing
for asylum: "only in a surrealistic world ca11 you argue that he [ElianJ is
making the asylum decision himsel£"21
Again, though the Hague Convention did not apply in the Eliin
case, it represents the international community's fairest legal recourse in
any international parental kidnapping case. Its philosophy reflects the
U.S. legal system's policy in domestic parental kidnappings; therefore,
the ideology representative of the Hague Convention should have
tempered media caricatures of a political asylum scenario.

Agenda-setting and Priming
Agenda-setting and priming represent some of the media's lesserknown but potent influences. The media can cover only a limited
amount of news, and everyone must turn to the media for news. The
media in deciding what to cover does not tell us what to think, but
controls what we think about. This is agenda-setting. According to
Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, "priming" refers to the media's
ability to influence and even determine the standards by which people
evaluate policies and their outcomes. "By calling attention ro some
matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards
by which governments, presidents, [and] policies ... are judged."22 By
applying Iyengar and Kinder's "priming hypothesis" to the Eliin case,
one concludes rhat the media's preoccupation with political asylum
makes such an outcome a chief standard by which the public judges the
outcome as fair. In other words, because the media emphasized political
asylum, people perceived that outcome as just and plausible, despite
jurisprudence.
The media increased the "fairness appeal" of Elian's asylum
by connecting that wish to the Cuban exile community, which is
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conceptually linked to ideas of warranted political asylum and hardwon justice. Common sense in concert with jurisprudence should have
restricted this debate ro legal reality, not media-invented legal standards.
Articles in US. News and World Report from April I 0, 2000-May 8,
2000, consistently commented on the asylum case and Elian's potential permanence in America. US. News and Wo1·ld Report's involvement represents a significant phase in rhe Elian saga because it
demonstrates a respectable weekly periodical's continued coverage of
the international tug-of-war. Of course, many other mediums began
incorporating the asylum hypothesis, such as grassroots websites, like
www.libertyforElidn.org, which sprang up over night, petitioning for
money and man-hours to help Elian stay in the U.S.
While some may view media coverage as an immaterial influence,
continued media coverage polarized public opinion, changing the
standards by which the public evaluated the case. This naturalization
debate roused legal watchdogs from their uneasy sleep and called
politicians co the plate. For example, three immigrant and human
rights groups filed arnica curea briefs, defending Elian's right to file for
asylum. And elected officials as well as late-night comedians bought
turns on the Elian-political-spin ride for the price of a few paltry sound
bites or wisecracks. The pages upon pages and hours upon hours of
commentary concerning the possibility of Elian's naturalization
involved individuals and groups who complicated a simple immigration policy and changed public perceptions of justice.
"The Hostage Video"
In addition to altering perceptions, the media interfered with this
case's resolution, vilifying public officials and disrupting court rulings.
A federal appeals court ruled that Reno acted legally in her decision to
return Elian to his father. 13 Accordingly an ultimatum was issued;
however, the Miami relatives flouted this ultimatum. After meeting
with them, the Attorney General felt that the Miami relatives would
not hand the boy over as the federal court ruling demanded.
A few hours after meeting with Reno, the Miami relatives released
footage that many have called "the hostage video. "2• This video shows
an obviously coached Elian defiantly waving his hand while sitting on
a bed with his legs crossed, looking like a long-suffering monk or a
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young mystic. The cultural icon Elian asserted, "Papa, I do not want to
go to Cuba. If you want to, stay here [in the U.S.]. I am not going to
Cuba. " 1S This footage starred a television chain reaction; cable
cdevision networks soon placed the hostage video in every living room
in America.lb
The hostage video delivered a personal blow to Reno who "pur the
prestige and credibility of her office on the line and saw it snubbed. "rThis video caused Reno, a duly appointed top-ranking official, to
appear unjust and insensidve to the feelings and needs of young Elian.
The media created the image char her legally sanctioned order to return
Elian to his father was an extreme and unnecessary act. Reno returned
ro Washington after the hostage video's release to allow the appeals
process to play out, confident her decision would be upheld, especially
in light of the court rulings validating her posicion.28
And of Course, the Made-for-TV Movie
While journalists disseminated the story, opportunistic screenwriters began ro compose an ostensibly disinterested summary of the
Eliin saga. Only the Fox Family Channel ultimately released a watereddown version called Th~ E/idn Gonzal~s Story. 29 N~w York Timu
television critic Caryn James insists that Fox's narrative favors the
Miami relatives' point of view." Fox's melodrama summarizes the
media's exacerbation of the whole incident. Fox produced Th~ Elidn
Gonzales Story after the case was resolved; nevertheless, the TV movie,
in an especially succinct way. encapsulates the media's equal treatment
of two parties' legal rights, which were in fact, not equal.
The Fox Family Channel's movie softened their portrayal of Elian's
Miami environment. James believes the TV reworking distorts "a
complex political battle into entertainment for the largest possible
audience, [because] the film creates a fantasy in which there are only
heroes."31 For instance, Fox depicts Lazaro Gonzales as a gentle "teddy
bear" of a great uncle, who did nor want to give up Elian because he
would miss him roo much. According to the Fox movie the Miami
relatives' only flaw, if anything, was doting too much on their long-lost
relative. ' 2
Of course, one must not fault the Miami relatives personally, but
the movie reflects a general media effort to shift from a discussion of
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law to an appeal for pity. The Fox movie legitimizes the Miami
relatives' legal stance by artistically creating a wholesome base from
which questionable legal claims might originate.
Politically, The Efidn Gonzales Story represents the producers' failed
attempts to avoid taking any side, perpetuating the legally illegitimate
idea that Eliin's Miami relatives had custodial claim to the young boy:
"This [movie] was going tO be about a little boy lost at sea, and
whether he belonged back with his father or with a loving uncle and
cous in. "33 Though the Fox Family Channel tried to produce an
apolitical movie, merely setting public agenda, telling viewers to think
about the Elian case and suggesting "a loving uncle and cousin's"
possible custody, influences the way people feel about this case's
aftermath. Most importantly, the movie did in fact favor the Miami
relatives' stance.
Conclusion
Of course, Elian ultimately returned to Cuba with his father, thus
abating the media and satisfYing what I have called in this article the
international and domestic jurisprudential momentum regarding child
abduction cases. I began this article commenting on some famous
images the media has captured from American history. Some felt that
the still photograph of Elian merited a Pulitzer Prize, suggesting in my
mind that this photo might become an important part of history.>-~
Most newspapers printed a large photograph of the federal marshall
seizing Elian and a smaller photograph of Elian's rew1ion with Juan
Miguel Gonzales, his father. 35 This fact, at the symbolic end of the
Elian case, demonstrates the media's tendency throughout the whole
saga to give lesser emphasis to what jurisprudence demanded all along:
the boy's reunion with his father. Certainly the media should report
current events, but it should not befuddle relatively basic legal processes,
or create justice outside the law. The presence of a photographer during
the raid typifies the media's interference in an international kidnapping
that demanded only the involvement of the law and the family.
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A PPLYING TH E ELIAN G ONZALEZ
C ASE TO C HILD A BUSE LAws
S.

LUKE LEININGER

In the context ofinfant child abuse Law, the similarities between the
circumstances ofElidn Gonzalez in Cuba and those ofany abused
American child require an examination ofthe
decision to send him back to Cuba.

n June of 1970, Laura Marie Hernandez and her husband were
charged with aggravated assault upon their small son Bobby. • On
March 25, 1971, after a year of counseling, Mrs. Hernandez pled
guilty to criminal neglect and abuse of her child. On October 5, 1972,
the juvenile court reviewed the case and recommended that Bobby
undergo a physical examination at a guidance clinic.1 On November 22,
1972, Protective Services received a report from the boy's kindergarten
teacher that he had come to school with facial bruises inflicted by
the mother and her husband.l Bobby had suffered excessive abuse.
Authorities finally removed him from his home and admitted him to
a pediatric unit for treatment.
The ensuing custody trial revealed the appalling abuse inflicted
upon the child. The record exposed horrible acts of parental neglect
and mistreatment including "forcing the minor to hug a tree for long
periods of time; making him stand outside in a bucket of water;
locking him in a closet; lcicking a chair out from underneath him ...
kicking him in the stomach; beating him with a shoe, towel, belt
buckle," 4 etc. In deciding whether to grant parental rights to Mr. and
Mrs. Hernandez, the court consulted a variety of infant child abuse
standards. In particular, Corpus juris Secundum says that "the court may
divest parents of their rights to a child found to be depriv~d, or shown

I
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to be abused, or likely to be abused in view of the abuse of other
children in the family."' Basing their decision on this standard, the
court terminated the parental rights of the Hernandez couple in light
of their consistent and ongoing record of abuse and neglect.
In this case, Hernandez v. State Ex Rei. Arizona Dept. of Econ.
Sec., the coun established the modern interpretation for the termination of parental rights in the United Stares. When formulating his
decision, rhe judge referred to A.R.S. §8-533, which sets forth the
following five grounds for parental rights termination:
1. That the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent has
made no effort to maintain a parental relationship with the child.
2. That the parent has neglected or \vilfully abused the child.
3. That the parent is unable co discharge the parental responsibilities
because of mental illness or mental deficiency and there are reasonable grounds co believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.
4. That the parent is deprived of his civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony if the felony of which such parent was convicted is
of such nature as co prove the unfirness of such parent to have future
custody and control of the child, or if the sentence of such parenr
is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for
a period of years.
5. That the parents have relinquished their rights to a child to an
agency or have consented to the adoption.6

The second of these grounds has particular application to the issue
of child abuse and parental rights. The Corpus juris Sewndum definition and A.R.S. §8-533 show that the policy of the American legal
system is not to send children back to abusive environments. In fact,
the primary object of infant child abuse law is to make all attempts to
save children from abuse and co further secure their safety. Immigration
and Nationalization Services and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
violated this principle when they, in essence, awarded parental rights to
a self-proclaimed and abusive father, Fidel Castro, and returned Elian
Gonzalez back to his hostile home in Cuba.
On November 21, 1999, Cuban citizen Elizabet Broton made a
courageous decision. Taking her six-year-old son Elian Gonzalez with
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her, Elizabec fled the highly abusive environment on the communist
island of Cuba. By attempting to escape from Cuba, she did what onefifth of the population of Cuba has done since Fidel Castro ruthlessly
cook power in 1959." Seeking freedom from the abusive dictatorship of
fidel Castro, Elizabet boarded a rickety aluminum boat with her son
and nine others and headed for Florida.
Sadly, Elizabet's treacherous journey came to an end when her
aluminum boat developed a leak and she drowned at sea. She gave her
Life to rescue her child from aJl abusive home and an abusive country.
Elian was rescued &om the ocean and brought to the safehold his mother
had envisioned, which was the home of her relatives in Miami, Florida.
Citing Cuba's "systematic violation of human rights" the United
Nations Human Rights Commission recently condemned the nation
for the eighth time. 8 Amnesty International and the U.S. State
Department have pronounced similar rebukes upon Cuba.9 Aware of
these conditions, the Eleventh Circuit Cou.rt referred to the U.S. State
Department's 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
Cuba. The Court states: "[The Cuban Government] continue[s]
systematically to violate fundamental civil and political rights of its
citizens." 10 Thousands of Cubans who risk their lives every year
traveling across the ocean in fragile boats to escape the oppressive,
Castro-dominated society provide only further evidence of the political
and physical abuse that continues to occur in Cuba. Cuban children are
denied the right to learn about God; they are forced to work under
degrading conditions in agricultural labor camps; and they suffer from
severe shortages of food, rationing of soap and meat, and a lack of
toothpaste and anesthesia. 11
The absence of basic rights and freedoms in Cuba is in stark
contrast to the liberties most people enjoy in the United States; the lack
of liberties can be likened to the environment of an abused child. Fidel
Castro is as an abusive father co the citizens of Cuba as he deprives
them of freedom and many of the common joys of life. In the context
of infant child abuse law, the similarities between the circumstances of
Elian Gonzalez in Cuba and those of any abused American child
require an examination of the decision sending him back to Cuba.
As shown in Hernandez v. State Ex Rel. Arizona Dept. of Econ.
Sec., laws protect children from being sent back to abusive parents,
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under whose care they will continue to suffer. Tragically, Elian
Gonzalez did not receive the same protection. Instead, an INS swat
team abducted him, dragged him into the coun system, and eventually
deported him !back to guardians who will deprive him of his freedom
and subject him to the abusive conditions.
In upholding the INS decision to reject Eliin's application for
asylum, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals relies on the INS policy
that only a parent can assist a child with asylum applications.' 2 Because
Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, refused permission for Elh\n to
seek asylum, the INS dismissed all three of Elian's requests without
consideration. According to United States Code, "any alien ... may
apply for asylum." 13 However, because the Code does nor address the
procedure for children applying for asylum, the Court grants "executive discretion" to the agency to develop their own policy.•• Using this
discretion, the agency required asylum requests for six-year-olds to be
filed by their parents.
Specifically, INS policy determined the following: (1) six-year-old
children lack the capacity to sign and to submit personally an
application for asylum; (2) instead, six-year-old children must be
represented by an adult in immigration matters; (3) absent special
circumstances, the only proper adult to represent a six-year-old child is
the child's parent, even when the parent is not in this country; and,
(4) that the parent lives in a communist-totalitarian state (such as
Cuba), in and of itself, does not constitute a special circumstance
requiring the selection of a nonparental representative.•s While the first
three points seem reasonable, the fourth violates the principles behind
the child abuse laws set forth in C.J.S. and A.R.S. §8-533. Juan Miguel
Gonzalez not only wanted to return his child to a "communisttotalitarian state," but also to an abusive environment where he would
then yield his parental rights to Fidel Castro, an acknowledged abuser.
Clearly this attitude shows that Mr. Gonzalez is not an adequate
representative of his child. Indeed, it appears that the INS has placed a
greater value on the issue of a father's rights to representation than it
has on a child's right to protection from abuse.
The Eleventh Circuit Cotut of Appeals and other agencies mistakenly construed the main issue of the case to be about a father's
rights. After all, most Americans are strong believers in the sanctity of
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the family. In her argument before the Federal Court supporting the
return of Elian to Cuba, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patricia
Maher made this point, "That decision , which was ratified by the
atcorney general [to return Elian to Cuba] gives effect to a longstanding policy of family unification and the internationally accepted
doctrine that parents have the right to speak for their children. " 16 This
interpretation reflects a noble desire to unite families when possible. In
fact, at flfSt glance the United States Legal Custody Requirement seems
to concur with the INS and favor this interpretacion of letting Elian's
rights rest in the hands of his father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, who
wanted him to return to Cuba. The Requirement says, "The putative
father of an illegitimate child has a right to custody of the child
superior co everyone but the natural mother."" However, there must
be exceptions to rhese stipulations when the well-being of the child is
in danger.
For this reason, the Requirement also says, similar to the "special
circumstance" clause in the INS policy, that United States policy is to
keep children with their natural parentS "unless there is a compelling
reason "not to." 18 The exception is granted, even here, for a parent to be
denied custody if there is a "compelling reason." Certainly there is no
more "compelling reason" than a communist country that has repeatedly
shown icself to be excessively oppressive and abusive to ics citizens.
Many are forgetting that when the INS sent Elian Gonzalez back
to Cuba with his father, they might as well have been placing him in
the hands of Fidel Castro himself In Cuba, parental rights do not exist.
They were not sending a son to be with his father. Once Elian and his
father set foot in Cuba, Mr. Gonzalez's rights as a parent, which our
Justice Department worked so hard to protect, were stripped from him,
and Elian's rights once again belonged to an abusive parent who
continues to deny basic human righcs to millions of Cubans. Elian's
rights might have been granted to his father by the U.S. Justice
Depanment, but the consequent flight to Cuba speedily rerurned those
rights to Fidel Castro and a government rhat does not grant rights to
biological parents.
Cuba's Code of the Child says, "Society and the state work for the
efficient protection of youth against all influences contrary to their
communist formation." 19 According to this law, if a parent in Cuba
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attempted to exercise parental rights in such a way that was beneficial to
the child but contrary to the will of the State, they would be overruled.
The Code also says, "Society and the state watch to ascertain that all
persons who come in contact with the child ... constitute an example
for the development of his communist personality."2° Cuba's own laws
betray the reality that in Cuba the actions of parents are determined by
the will of the government. Commenting on the Code of the Child,
Alberto Luzarraga of the Cuban American Research Group says, "The
words are long and boring. But their meaning .is inhuman. They mean
that in Cuba, the real parent is the Marxist Srate."21
How will Fidel Castro and the Marxist State, Elian's self-declared
parents, treat him? In Cuba, Elian is already in the process of being
forcefully indoctrinated into a socialist way of thought. He will live
with his father until the age eleven. At this age, he will be sent to work
in a farm-labor camp for forty-five to sixty days per year. At these
camps, many children do not leave without venereal diseases and other
serious health problems. He will be enrolled in compulsory military
service until the age of twenty-seven. His chances for a college
education will depend, not on his capacity for learning, but on whether
or not his "political attitude and social conduct" are in line with the
communist regime. In school he will be taught not to believe in
religion and to hate everything that is contrary to communism, which
includes his own mother. 22 As Cuba's Code of the Child shows, this is
the policy of the Cuban State toward children. Juan Miguel Gonzalez
has almost no influence or power to save his son from this abuse.
How could we consider Juan Miguel Gonzalez the "putative father"
of Eliin Gonzalez and put him in control of Elian's rights, knowing
that in Cuba "the real parent is the Marxist State"? Certainly, a "special
circumstance" should have been gratued for Elian's rights to be
represented by someone other than an abusive dictator. Mr. Gonzalez
was not in the United States as a father; he was here as a vassal of Fidel
Castro, representing him in word and deed. Recall that U.S. custody
law states that '•the court may divest parents of their rights to a child
found to be deprived, or shown to be abused, or likely to be abused in
view of the abuse of other children in the family. " 2~ Considering the
undeniable evidence of the abusiveness of Fidel Castro and the Cuban
government toward their people, the Eleventh Circuit Court should
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have effectively terminated their parental rights to Elian Gonzalez and
granted an asylum request.
Alina Fernandez, the exiled daughter of Fidel Castro, supported
this view in her interview with Larry King when she said, "But you
know, among Americans, you use the word 'custody' and 'parental care'
and stuff like that. It doesn't exist in Cuba. And then you're forgetting, too, that the American legal system is not sending back a boy to
his father. The American legal system is sending back a boy to a
dictator who leads a regime that four years ago sank a tugboat, killing
11 children, in front of the Cuban harbor. T hat's the point. " 24 While it
may be noble and right to strive for family unification through parental
rights, it becomes wrong and even illegal to return a small child to an
abusive home.
Elian Gonzalez's mother gave her life to save her boy from a future
of exploitation and slavery. When the United States government
condemned the boy to return to this abuse and oppression by his
proclaimed parents, Fidel Castro and the communist regime, they
might as well have sent every victim of child abuse back to live with
their abusers.
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DISCRETIONARY PO WER AN D
NORMATIVE DECISION -MAKING
AARON RENFRO

Because Congms cannot feasibly design a law tbat applies in every
circumstance, U.S. immigration law allows for a reasonable
interpretation ofmany ofits provisions and the exercise of
discretion in appropriate circumstances.

A

year ago, America's heart and mind turned toward a six-yearold Cuban boy named Elian Gonzalez. H e was found at sea by
passing fishermen who noticed a capsized boat floating in the
Florida straits. Having managed co survive for two days holding onto a
life ring, the boy was brought ro the United States. In the ensuing
months, America became divided as to Elian's fate and the boy became
part of an intense, high-profile political and legal battle. Despite
attempts of the politically powerful Cuban exile community to keep
the boy in the U.S., governmen t authorities returned Elian to rhe
custody of his father in Cuba.
This article addresses some of the important legal decisions made in
determining Elian's fate and discusses important normative principles
that guided government authorities in their decision-making process. It
wilJ become evident that government authorities acted in accordance
with the prescribed laws of the land. However, by applying the Attorney
General's discretionary power, and an alternative interpretation of
relevant statutes, a different, though legally justifiable, outcome could
have occurred. Because Congress cannot feasibly design a law that
applies in every circumstance, U.S. immigration law allows for a
reasonable interpretation of many of its provisions and the exercise of
discretion in appropriate circumstances. As a result, such laws may be
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interpreted to justify conclusions that oppose one another, placing an
added emphasis on normative decision-making, or what "should" be the
outcome. By opting to return Elian to Cuba, governmental authorities
placed priority of parental rights over other legitimate concerns. This
normative decision was fundamentally sound and based on morally
defensible reasoning.
Upon being found, Elian was immediately turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a sector of the Department of Justice overseeing and administering American immigration
matters. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the source
of U.S. immigration law, Elian was considered to be an applicant for
admittance into the United States.• Under such circumstances, the
Attorney General has discretionary authority to (I) continue to detain
an arrested alien, (2) release the alien on bond, or (3) release the alien
on conditional parole.2 Attorney General Janet Reno opted to place
Elian on conditional parole by placing him in temporary custody of his
Miami relatives, headed by his great-uncle Lazaro Gonzalez.
Giving parole status to Elian was the first of three occasions on
which the Attorney General used her "discretionary power." The
second was the denial of the asylum applications submitted by the
Miami relatives, and the third was the revoking of Elian's parole status
on April 12, 2000. Discretionary power in immigration matters is
derived from Congress, which legitimately delegates much of its
immigration power to the Attorney General. This power is most often
used when Congress fails to spell our specific standards that apply to a
given case. The Attorney General may rely on any reasonable factors in
exercising this discretionary power in order to arrive at an appropriate
outcome in a particular circumstance.J If a decision is challenged in
court, great deference is given to such discretionary authority and a
decision based on its exercise will be overturned only if it is determined
that the Attorney General acted unreasonably and thus abused such
discretion. Thus, the discretionary power stands as the source of legal
legitimacy the Attorney General uses to make his or her case if there is
no applicable objective law that dictates the outcome. Inherent in this
discretionary power is the freedom to make normative decisions that
align with the decision-makers' belief systems and moral perspectives.
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Shortly after being granted temporary custody of Elian, his Miami
:elacives filed three separate asylum applications in an effort to gain
;>ermanent cusrody. To determine rhe legitimacy of rhese applications,
;he INS and d1e Attorney General began a Legal analysis to decide who
bad legal authority to speak on behalf of the six-year-old. Was it Elian's
Father, his great-uncle in Mianu, or orher attorneys claiming to represent him? The INS examined U.S. immigration law, Cuban family law,
and Florida state law to make its decision. Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, the general rule states, "Any alien who is physically
present in rhe U.S. or who arrives in the U.S. (including an alien who
is brought to the U.S. after having been interdicted in international or
U.S. waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum."•
The phrase "any alien" is not defined by the statute. Thus, rhe Attorney
General was required to use her discretionary power to determine if the
six-year-old fell within the definition.
To gain further insight, rhe INS and the Attorney General turned
to Cuban fanlily law, which provides that "minors shall be under the
authority of rheir parents and the parental aurhority is shared jointly by
both parents. Should one parent die, the surviving parent becomes the
sole individual aurhorized to speak for rhe child."~ These parental rights
include the duty to represent rhe rights of the child in all legal matters.
Regarding custody disputes between parents and third parties, Florida
law states, "When the custody dispute is between a parent and rhird
parties, ... the test must include consideration of rhe right of a natural
parent to enjoy the custody, fellowship, and companionship of his
offspring. This is a rule older rhan common law itself."6 Recognizing
that both Florida state law and Cuban family law emphasize parental
rights, the INS and Attorney General determined that the phrase "any
alien" in the INA statute did not apply to a six-year-old that had a legal
parent to speak on his behal£ Taking all factors into account, the INS
decided that without the formal consent of Elian's father Juan Miguel,
neither his great uncle, nor any attorney had legal authority to represent Elian in immigration matters.
Required to use her discretionary power, Attorney General Janet
Reno freely interpreted immigration laws and statutes in accordance
with her perception of the appropriate outcome. The subjectivity
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inherent in such normative decisions often creates controversy chat
imbues the nation's citizenry. Both those favoring Eliin's return and
chose opposing it provided normative explanations of their own rooted
in moraJiy justi.6.able reasoning. However, the discretion is left: co the
Attorney General co determine what principles are applicable to chis
case. Favoring Elian's return co Cuba, the Attorney General and the INS
focused on laws promoting the rights of legitimate parents over their
children in immigration matters. These laws are based on che w1derlying
principle that families are the fundamental unit of every sociery and
deserve the utmost respect and protection from forces of disintegration.
This principle should be used as a scandard in immigration matters and
as a guiding policy in future cases. The U.S. government has no right co
interfere in viable family units that are characterized by loving relationships and mutual support. Laws must not promote the disintegration of
viable family units, but instead seek co protect them.
Continuing their evaluation of the case, the INS and Attorney
General interviewed Elian's father to evaluate his relationship with the
boy and to determine if the Cuban government had coerced him in any
way. If government authorities found evidence of coercion, they could
justify a decision on Elian's behalf without regards to the father's
wishes. Thus, they could reverse their previous reasoning emphasizing parental rights over their children. However, INS officials sent to
interview the father determined chat the Cuban government had not
influenced the father's interests and instead found an endearing fatherson relationship. Consequently, the government officials saw no reason
co deny Elian's father his parental rights.
By our detailing some of the important events preceding the INS
final decision, it is evident that government authorities interpreted both
U.S. and Cuban laws in a reasonable fashion. Because no objective law
was applicable to chis case, a necessity arose for the Attorney General co
use her discretionary power, allowing for her own values and principles
co determine the outcome. These normative values promoted parental
rights and family values. They considered the rights of a loving fiuher co
have custody of his child paramount to ocher concerns that suggested a
different outcome. Without convincing evidence char a parent's interests
fail co align with his or her child's legal interests, parental rights should
be given priority in immigration matters.
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A Different Outcome
Had the Elian Gonzalez case occurred during the term of a
djfferent U.S. administration, could the result have differed? The
answer is "yes." The preceding paragraphs provided an analysis of some
of che important legal decisions made concerning Elian's bee and a
normative anaJysis used in support. Although government authorities
used both U.S. and Cuban law in their interpretation, the following
analysis indicates that a decision to keep Eliin in the United States
could also have been legally justified. However, legal justification does
not necessarily signify moraJ justification. Normative principles must
be used to determine the appropriate outcome co the case.
When government authorities denied Elian the right to apply for
asylum, Eliin's Miami relatives chaJlenged the decision in federaJ court,
asking for a temporary restraining order on the ruling. Upon bearing
the case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of appeaJs determined that Elian
had a right to appeaJ for asylum and cited possible abuses of power by
government authorities. Essentially, the court took a different approach
to the lNA generaJ rule previously seated, "Any alien who is physically
present in the U.S. or who arrives in the U.S .... irrespective of such
alien's status, may apply for asylum."" The Eleventh Circuit considered
the phrase "any aJien" broad enough to include a six-year-old boy. This
broad interpretation, called the "plain language approach," seeks co
interpret laws as they are plainly written in text, disregarding inferences
made from them or other laws that may skew their originaJ intent. The
court reasoned that "if Congress had meant to include only some
aliens, perhaps Congress would not have tLSed the words 'any alien."'s
Although later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit determined that neither the INS nor the Attorney General
bas the right to infringe on the plain language of the statute, nor could
the INS narrow the scope of the statute through regulation. ~ Any
evidence of such action would be deemed an abuse of power. If the
INS and the Attorney General had opted to use a pbin language
approach in their decision-making process, they may have considered
the case to be of "special interest" in which the rights of a child to
live in America outweigh the parenta1 rights of a father living in a
totalitarian/communist regime.
Because a different interpretation could have guided the case in the
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opposite direction, it is important ro determine if asylum could have
appropriately been awarded to Elian had the Attorney General and INS
accepted the applications for d1e reasons cited. The Immigration and
Nationality Act allows the Attorney General co grant asylum or refugee
status to those utdividuals who are (1) outside their country or nationaliry, {2) unable to or unwilling to return or to avail themselves of the
protection of chat country, (3) being persecuted or have a well-founded
fear of persecution, (4) based on race, religion, nacionaliry, membership
in a particular social group, or political opiruon. 10
Elian could have easily met the first two tenets of the INA
definition of "asylee" or "refugee." In addition to being outside of
his country of descent, evidence also existed of Elian's desire to stay in
the United Stares. However, attorneys would have needed a strong
argument to convince rhe government char the remaining tenets
applied to Elian's case. They would have ro prove that Elian could
reasonably fear greater harm than other Cubans. Attorneys could have
argued chat if Elian returned to Cuba, Fidel Castro would use Elian as a
symbol of his regime, placing the child under life-long scrutiny. 11 This
scrutiny would have required that his actions follow every tenet of the
Cuban Revolution, which American law deems as a form of persecution. Attorneys could have also argued that Elian feared persecution
based on a social group including chose exposed to the freedoms of the
United States. Furthermore, arguments against Fidel Castro's human
rights record and his defiling treatment of Cubans interdicted at sea
may have proved convincing.
Numerous arguments could have attested to a well-founded fear of
persecution awaiting Elian in Cuba. From a legal perspective, had these
applications been accepted, these arguments could have easily justified
a decision co grant Elian asylum. Thus, that same power used by the
Attorney General to remove Elian from the United States could also
have been used to grant him asylum. For that reason a different U.S.
administration may have chosen an alcernarive destiny for Elian. Either
outcome could have occurred within a reasonable interpretacion of
immigration laws.
Although the legal perspective would allow for the justification of
either outcome, normatively speaking, it is essential to follow principles
that are in the best inrerest of the child and the family. Those opposing
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the Arrorney General's decision to return Elian to Cuba argued that
sending the boy back to a totalitarian/communist government was a
moral crime. It was semencing a child to a life of misery and a violation
of American principles such as freedom, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. These arguments are understandable and deserve attention.
However, they support the replacing of a :f.ither with a government.
Governments must never remove the agency of a parent by placing
grearer priority of their decisions over those of a loving parent. This is
outside of the jurisdiction of any governmem. Juan Miguel, Elian's
father, was interviewed and determined to be a loving father with
genuine concern for the life of his child. Such evidence should signal to
government decision-makers that the parent has the ultimate say in the
matter.
Had Elian's father opted to live in the United States with his son,
perhaps both sides would have been appeased. Although contrary to
the beliefs of many, the decision of Elian's father to return to Cuba
must be respected and protected by the government. The Attorney
General and the INS acted with reasonable discretion in determining
the fate of Elian. By placing priority on parental rights, their decisions
were morally justifiable and established a standard to guide immigration law in the appropriate direction.
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PARENTAL RIGHTS V. BEST
INTEREST: A W AR BETWEE N
PARENTS AND G RANDPARE NTS
MATT C HRISTENSEN
Th~ U.S. Suprnn~ Court's tkcision in Trox~l v. GranviU~

a propnvalidation oftlu constiNttional guaranu~ ofparental rights; individual
states need to reevaluate their staNJUs to mmre the parental rights
delinteated in the 14th Amendment.

T
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ommie GranviUe and Brad Troxel Lived together in the state of
Washington until 1991. Although never married, at the time
of separation they had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie.
After the separation, Brad resumed living with his parents and often had
his daughters over for the weekend with their paternal grandparents. In
May of 1993, Brad committed suicide. Brad's parents, rhe Troxels,
continued to see Isabelle and Natalie until October of 1993. At this
time, Tommie informed the grandparents that she wished to limit the
visitation to one visit per month. The Troxels brought a case in court
based on a Washington state statute allowing "any person [to] petition
the court for visitation rights at any time. "1 They requested visitation
two weekends a month and two weeks during the summer. Tommie
wanted to allow only one day of visitation per month, with no summer
stay. The case finally reached the Washington Supreme Court, who
ruled in favor ofTommie, stating that the state statute wa.~ unconstitutional. The Troxels brought the case before the U.S. Supreme Court in
January of 2000; the court ruled last June. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the Washington Supreme Court's decision that the statute was
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unconstitutional, supporting Tommie in her choices for raising her
children.
In Troxel v. Granville, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the
parental rights standard to rule the Washington State statute unconstitutional. The parental rights standard, by which parents are allowed to
make decisions regarding their children, is one of two standards used
by the Supreme Court in deciding visitation rights. The other standard
is the best interest standard, which considers the children's best interest.
These standards can be synonymous or mutually exclusive. When these
standards are not in harmony, the best interest standard is preferred
only if parents are unfit to raise their children. However, when the
parents are fit to raise their children, the best interest standard
is unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Troxel
v. Granville was a proper validation of the constitutional guarantee
of parental rights; therefore, individual states need to reevaluate
their statutes to ensure the parental rights delineated in the 14th
Amendment.
Best Interest Standard
When courts use the best interest standard, it is usually to go
against something the parents have wished because "by the very nature
of this 'best interest of the child' doctrine, custody decisions are not
made from the parents' perspective but rather the child's."2 This is one
of the main arguments against using this standard. Essentially the best
interest standard gives the courts, rather than parents, power to make
family decisions such as visitation rights.
Courts award visitation rights based on the best interest standard
according to three different justifications. The first.justification concerns the obligations of the courts to protect the children in its jurisdiction. This obligation is rooted in the state's parens patriae power
designed to help state citizens that need special protection. This group
usually includes racial minorities, gender minorities, and minor
children. Thus, the state has an obligation to ensure that children in the
state are provided for.
A Pennsylvania court utilized the parens patriae power in a concurring opinion for a 1995 case, Rowles v. Rowles. Leading up to the
court proceedings, the parents moved in with the children's grandparents.
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Two months after the birth of the second child, the parents moved our,
leaving the children behind. They were having marital problems and did
nor want to subject the children to unneeded contention. A year and a
half later the parents divorced. The divorce proceedings involved granting
legal guardianship of the two children to their grandparents. But six
months later, the mother petitioned for custody of her children. The
court questioned the "prima facie presumption chat parems have a right
co custody of their children as against third parties."~ The Pennsylvania
court argued that sometimes a biological relationship does not guarantee
rhe best care possible for the child, and the court "should not be

restrained solely by [this] presumption."4 Unfortunately, this court's
decision does not emphasize the right that only parentS, not third parties,
have according ro the Constitution.
Courts also use the parms patriae power to justify awarding
custody or visitation to a third parry who can better provide for the
children. In the Troxel case, the first Washington State court found that
the Troxels could "provide opportunities for the children in the areas of
cousins and music and the children would be benefited &om spending
quality time with the [Troxels]." ~ However, the Washington Stare
Supreme Court, and subsequendy the U.S. Supreme Court, overruled
chis lower court. In irs ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court states: "The
Due Process Clause [in the Constitution] does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child-rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a ' better' decision could
be made." 6 In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court pronounced that
because someone else can better care for a child, or because someone
else can provide differently for a child, is not a good enough reason for
taking that child away from his or her parentS.
The second way to justify implementing the best interest standard
concerns the fitness of the parent. A stare may have a right to intervene
and award visitation or custody to a third parry if rhe third party can
prove that a parent is unfit; however, proving that a parent is unfit is
very difficult.
In a 1921 Minnesota case, the state Supreme Court laid out the
requirements of proving unfitness. In this case, Ruth Platzer signed
an agreement consem.ing to the adoption of her baby girls by R. W.
Beardsley. On May 23, the Beardsleys filed a petition to adopt the
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child. Ruth appeared and revoked her consent to the adoption, stating
that she wanted the child back. The Beardsley's arguments co Ruth
were based on two things: the agreement she had signed and their belief
that they could take better care of the child. Based on past state court
precedent, the court dismissed the Beardsley's first argument about the
agreement, seating that the agreement "created no binding obligations
respecting the custody of the child."- The court then rurned to the
Beardsley's second argument, their claim that they could better care for
the child rhan the child's morher. In deciding the case, the Minnesota
Supreme Courr dispelled assumptions about unfitness:
The cies by which mother and child are bound together should nor
be severed except for grave and weigbry reasons.... The mere fact
that a mother is so destitute or impoverished char she cannot
adequately provide for the needs of her child and that someone else is
willing to rake it and give it better educational and material
advamages does nor justifY rhe court in transferring its custody.*
ln a 1925 custody case, the same state coun stated: "The naruraJ
parents have the first right to the care and cusrody of the child .... Mere
poverty of the parents is seldom, if ever, a sufficient ground for depriving
them of the natural right of the custody of their child.'"1 In both of these
cases, custody of the child was awarded to the narural parents.
The third jUSTification some courts use to support the best interest
standard is the harm done to children when deprived of rheir relationship with their grandparents or a third parry. Psychologists, behavioral
scientists, and legislators argue chat children benefit from the intergenerational relations children have with their grandparents. The
problem with this argument is that "little empirical data is available to
assess the merits of grandparent visitation. "•• Family law practitioner,
David Walther states: "Courts and legislators are making a tenuous leap
of logic in finding court-ordered grandparent visitation is in rhe best
interest of the grandchildren . . . . We are left with only anecdotal
evidence and presumptions about whether court-ordered grandparent
visitation is in a child's best interests. " 11 Because of the lack of srudies
to conclusively prove that court-ordered grandparent visitation helps
the relations and emotional well-being of the children involved, the
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argument that these relationships are beneficial cannot be used to take
rights away from parents.
Despite the lack of studies done on court-ordered grandparent
child visitation, the best interest standard can and sometimes should be
used when harm to a child is proven. The grandparents must prove that
allowing visitation will remedy the harm caused; however, rhe courts
have turned this argument around, assuming from the beginning that
visitation is in the best interest of the child. This wrongly leaves the
burden of proof on the parents. In her opinion of the Troxel v. Granville case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor referred to this change. She
explained, "In effect, [the Washington Supreme Court] placed on
Granville the burden of disproving that visitation would be in her
daughters' best interest and thus failed to provide any protection of
her fundamental right. "'l If courts place the burden of proof on
parents, they are disrupting parents' fundamental rights. Associate
Professor of Law Laurence Nolan believes, "The courts have lost sight
of the fact that it is the parent who has a right to uninterrupted
custody. "'3 It is the grandparents upon whom the burden of proof
should lie, not the parents.
As we see from the three justifications previously mentioned, only
if the unfitness of parents can be proved should the rights of the
parents be overturned and the best interest standard used. In all other
cases the court would have a hard time justifying its relevance on rhe
best interest standard. The best interest standard does not have any set
qualitative measures by which to judge. It is an unfair balancing test
between two parties. Each party gives irs reasons for the best interest of
the children and the party with the best reasons usually wins. The
problem with having a balancing test is judges are forced ro rule solely
by opinion because there are no guidelines on which to base their
ruling. In the Troxel case, the first judge ruled completely differently
than the second and subsequent judges. If judges have no qualirative
measures in making their decisions, then they are free to make
whatever decision they feel would be right. This results in widely
differing opinions on the same issues, which only serves to compound
the problem. On the other hand, the parental rights standard is not a
balancing test that relies solely on a judge. It does have some qualitative
and constitucional measures a judge can use in determining visitation.
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This leads to less confusion, and serves to help solve the problem,
instead of compounding it.

Parental Rights Standard
Originally, grandparenrs and others had no legal basis for
requesting visitation. Parents allowed visitation based on a moral
obligation, rather than a legal one. Early courts normally did not
intervene in this area, believing that if they were to do so, it would just:
worsen relations between the parents and grandparents. H The firsc case
the Supreme Court used in deciding these issues and describing a
parental right justification was Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923. In this case,
Nebraska had a law forbidding the teaching of foreign languages in
school to anyone \vho had not passed the eighth grade. Meyer was
a reacher in a public school who was charged with teaching German
to a ten-year-old child. In its ruling, the Court stated that parents had
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution to raise their
children as they saw fit. The Court held chat rhe state statute not to
reach foreign language in the schools was a violation of liberty
protected by the 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment protects the
right to "engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, co marry, establish a home and bring up children. "15
In many other cases the Supreme Court upholds consticurional rights
of parents to raise their children as they see 6t. 16
Another recent example of che parental rights standard taking
priority over the best interest standard is the Elian Gonzalez situation
of last year. Elian and his mother escaped Cuba without his father
knowing. Elian's mother subsequently died en route to the U.S. Elian's
father requested his son's return. The extended family in the United
States wanted him to stay in the U.S. They argued that he would have a
better life here and better chances in the future. The U.S. Justice
Department might have used the court precedenr in visitation standards
to justify their actions in sending him back and upholding his
biological father's wishes. Elian's father traveled to the United States
and the Justice Department rerurned Elian to his facher in Cuba against
his relatives' wishes. Although the child, according to his relatives in the
U.S., may have had more opportunities in the Unired States, the wishes
of his father were upheld.
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The parental rights standard has a strong constitutional background. When the U.S. Supreme Court decides on any statures that
may violate a constitutional right, in this case parental rights, the court
applies the test of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is tbe highest of three
rests the Supreme Court uses in making rulings. If a case is based on
rights deftned in the Constitution, the strict scrutiny test requires that
rbe srate must have a solid reason for raking away chat right. In
applying this test, the Court must look at the state's justification for

overruling che 14th Amendmem liberty interest of the parents. If the
state's justification is not a compelling state interest, one that the state
can prove is required for the well-being of its citizens, then the Court
will declare the statute unconstitutional. & shown before, there is only
one valid justification for a state to overrule parental rights-when a
parent is proven unfit. Indeed, in the Troxel case the Supreme Coun
states:
So long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family ro further question the abiJjry of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.,-

However, many states do not currently use this standard in their
statutes. Even though this standard has the strongest court backing and
constitutional protection, the states still base their statutes on the best
interest standard. The current Utah Jaw on visitation is a good example
of such a state statute.
The Utah statute lists five reasons why the court may override a
parent's decision and allow grandparent visitation: (1) it is in che best
interest of the grandchild, (2) the petitioner is a fit and proper person
to have rights of visitation with the grandchild, (3) the petitioner has
repeatedly attempted to visit the grandcbiJd and has not been allowed
to visit the grandchild as a direct result of the actions of the parent or
parents, (4) there is no ocher way for the petitioner to visit the grandchild without court intervention, and (5) the petitioner has rebutted
the presumption that the parents' decision to refuse or limit visitation
with the grandchild was reasonable. 18 After looking ar these reasons, we
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see that numbers three, four, and five all are dependent on proving
number one. As shown before, the grandparents must prove that rhe
visitation is in the best interest of the child. If that cannot be proven,
then the only reason for visitation that remains, under the Utah law, is
the unfitness of rhe parents.
The Utal1 statute does nor differ much from other scares. If the
parental rights standard is the standard with the strongest constitutional
backing, why do the stares have statutes like Utah's that support the best
inrerest standard? Many legislatures do not seem to fully understand
the best interest doctrine. The scare legislators are doing what they think
and feel is right based on the grandparenrs' perspective; yet ir seems as if
the legislatures do not fully understand the legal and constitutional
issues involved in disregarding parents' rights to raise their children as
they see fie.
Validation for the Supreme Court's Ruling
Which standard is better? Many would argue that the parenral
rights standard incorporates the best interest standard because parents
are going to do what is in the best interest of their children. While this is
often true, if a court intervenes to grant visitation ro a parry whom the
parents do nor want their child co see, then that court is undermining
the parent's power co act in their child's best interest. The requirements
of the best interest standard dictate chat a petitioner muse have been
deprived of visitation in one form or another-otherwise they would
nor be petitioning for visitation. This means that if the court has used
the best interest standard to award visitation ro grandparents, it muse be
because the parents did not want their child to visit his or her grandparents. The court, by awarding visitation, is then interpreting the best
interest of the children differently than do rhe parents of the child.
Thus, the parental rights standard is in direct conflict with the best
interest standard-the two cannot exist ar the same rinle. Parents can act
in the best interest of their children; however, when the court deliberates
on a case using the best interest srandard, it cannot be using the parental
rights standard at the same time. The simple fact that the best interest
standard is used means the court is going against what parents wish for
their children, thereby discarding the parents' rights, and subsequently
the standard connected with them. In Troxel v. Granville, however, the
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Supreme Court validated the constitutional guarantee of parental rights
and upheld the parental rights standard.
The parental rights standard has strong constitutional backing. The
best interest standard does not. The courts have specifically found a
fundamental right of parents to raise their children. Nowhere has a
fundamental right of grandparents to visit their grandchildren been
found. This would lend more credibility to the parental rights
argument.
Conclusion
Every state has laws regarding visitation rights of third parties with
children. How constitutional are these laws? The best interest standard
is extremely fluid. It is often wrongly applied and misunderStood. There
are no set regulations for applying it. The best interest standard is used
when third parties wish to have visitation rights with a child against the
wishes of the child's parents. This negates the fundamental right of
parents to raise their child. It is appalling that there are states with
unconstitutional statutes regarding visitation . Legislators and politicians
should reexamine their state's statutes, making them constitutional.
The parental rights standard has a stronger constitutional basis and
historically has been upheld by the Supreme Court more frequently
than the best interest standard. Troxel v. Granville, consistent with the
constitutional guarantee, shows that the parental rights standard should
be the prevalent standard. Parents have a fundamental, constitutional
right to raise their children how they see fit. The only reason that
parents could lose that right is due to unfitness or a compelling state
interest-one that would withstand the strictest scrutiny of the
Supreme Court. The state cannot dictate to the parents how to raise
their children, nor allow others to do it for them.
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THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AcT
AND INS DETENTI ON
SYED FAHAD SAGHIR

It is tragic that the United States, in its effort to deal with
immigration problems, resorted to punishing asylum
seekers in inhttmane ways.

merica has long prided itself on being called the land of
immigrancs, a melring pot of diverse cultures, a respite from
dictatorial regimes, and an upholder of human rights. Thus, it
is not surprising that millions of immigrancs have come to America.
However, faced with an unprecedented multitude of immigrants
straining the economy, Congress had to pass laws restricting immigration to the United States. Like most other developed Western
countries, the United States granted refuge to asylum seekers who were
able to demonstrate a credible fear of persecution of any kind in their
home country.' This policy soon began to be abused as too many
immigrancs started to obtain refugee status in this country on meritless
claims. Further, many resident immigrancs were allowed to stay in the
country after having committed crimes here. 2 In 1996, the total
removable population in the United States, which includes resident as
weU as illegal immigrants, had reached approximately five million. 3
Therefore, in an effort to curb this tide, Congress enacted two comprehensive statutes in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Acr4 and the illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Act
(IIRIA).s While these aces successfully made it harder tO obtain asylum
co the United Scates, there were some unpleasant repercussions of these
acts as well, such as limited judicial review of asylum cases, crowded

A
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Immigracion and Naturalization Services (INS) detention cenrers,
mandatory detention of cenain asylum seekers, and a depletion of INS
resources. It is tragic chat the United States, in ics effort to deal with
immigration problems, resorted to punishing asylum seekers in
inhumane ways. The detrimental effects of the rwo acts warrant a
change in the current immigration policies. The United States' policies
must be modified co be more compliant with irs high standard of
human rights.
One of the main consequences of the Reform Act is the mandatory
detention of some immigrants in local prisons and INS detention
facilities. 6 The new act also established rhe "expedited removal" policy,
which requires the INS to promptly remove certain aliens,' and limits
rhe judicial review of removal orders for cenain immigrants.•
Aliens who had committed crimes in the U.S. have always been
subject to deportation. 9 The Reform Act makes it easier for INS to
deporc aliens who have been convicted of a crime. It broadens rhe
definition of deportable crimes and requires that the INS ace promptly
to remove the criminal aliens. 10 A big problem arises with this broad
definition as any immigrant who has served a year or more in prison
can be subjected to deportation. This problem is further aggravated, as
a criminal whose sentence has been suspended is as likely to be
deported as any orlter immigrant who has served his entire senrence. 11
This act becomes fimher unjust, as an immigrant may be deponed for
a crime that, according co present laws , incurs a one-year prison
sentence bur did not at the time of conviction. 12 While it may seem
reasonable to deport an alien based on present laws, the legal authorities should not ignore the fact that the immigrant may not have committed the crime if he knew chat a crime incurred a one-year prison
sentence. This policy affronts fairness in dealings with immigrants.
While the act has been successful at deterring meridess asylums,
rhe new system might also have resulted in genuine cases being rejected
due co limited judicial review. If an immigrant requests asylum, she is
interviewed by an agent who determines her eligibiUry for refuge. The
immigrant is detained while awaiting the agent's response. 11 During this
detention time, her concacr with the outside world is limited by the
rules of the detention facilities. If the agenr determines that she does
not qualify for asylum, the immigrant may request a review from an
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immigration judge, and she is again detained while she awaits the
judge's decision. If the judge agrees with me officer, the removal order
is carried out. 14 Even though the asylum seeker is given another chance
after being determined ineligible the first rime, it must be understood
that a slight human error might be throwing a person into an abyss of
despair and persecution. The new act severely restricts judicial review
of removal decisions. The Reform Act restricts me issues that a court
may review on hab~as corpzts, which would allow many detained
immigrants judicial review. Hence, a court may not review a removal
decision even if the immigrant has a true fear of persecution.
Additionally, the Reform Act has increased the casks of the INS.
INS detainees represent a significant and growing part of the today's
jail population in the United Scates. In late October 1998, there were
more than 16,400 persons in INS custody, triple the number five years
ago. 1) Over 155,000 detainees passed through INS facilities in 1997
alone. 16 An INS spokesperson in Washington an nounced, "We
apprehend and take imo custody more people than any other agency in
the world." 1- The INS also has the largest armed federal agent force
in the United States. 11 The need for a larger INS came with the passing of these two acts, which made detention more likely for asylum
seekers and convicted criminal aliens. Behind these scary numbers are
certain detainees who cannot be released and might be "facing a virtual
life sentence. " 1' While these acts sharply increased the number of
detainees, the INS did not get a proporcionate increase in funding.
This resulted in crowded detention centers and even more problems for
the detainees.
In Florida, INS detainees stay either in Krome Processing Center
(Krome) in Miami, Florida, or in a county jail.20 In 1996, when the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) was conducting a study of the
reality at Krome, INS prevented the group from seeing the true
conditions, which posed a health and safety hazard to the detainees. ~ 1
The detainees at Krome do not have a proper list of legal services,
which the detainees can use for help with the immigration matters. The
list contains organizations that do not provide legal services or are at
too great a distance to visit Krome. Calls to attorneys were cut off
after fifteen minutes.u However, recent INS Detention Standards allow
detainees to make free calls to their legal agencies. Nevertheless, they
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cannot make international collect calls. This poses a problem for those
who have to get some identification documentS &om their families
back home. Previously, detainees at Krome were required co waive their
right to a meal if they spoke to an attorney during their mealtime.
Fortunately, this practice has been discontinued.
Women and children suRer most primarily because they are the least
in numbers. Approximately 7% of INS detainees are women and 3.5%
of INS detainees are children under the age of eighteen. 23 A memorandum from Detention Enforcement Officers, among other things,
contained that criminal aliens and male detainees shared the same bathrooms with minors, that there were only six beds for thirty-nine women,
that ventilation was poor in the room that housed women and children,
and that there were no recreational facilities for women and children/• Pregnant women remained without appropriate medical Facilities
and diet.
Innocent children pay a heavy price for the actions of their parents.
Children spend rheir days in detention centers with little care for
juvenile needs. INS has, however, opened children's shelters around the
country. One of these is the Liberty County Juven ile Correctional
Center, about an hour and a half drive from Houston. Even though it
is a juvenile center, the children have to wear prison uniforms, are pat
searched, and live in cells for twenty-three hours a day. 25 Although the
INS has started to provide children with three hours of instructions
every weekday, the service is of limited use as it is in English and the
majority of the children don't understand English. 26
No one can disagree that it is tragic for the United Stares, one of
the richest countries in the world, to inflict such creatments on people
who left their homes with hopes of better lives. Cheryl Little, Attorney
and Executive Director of d1e Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Inc.
(FIAC), expresses her pessimism in the University of Miami Inter-

American Law Revitw:
Amnesty International has made repeated attempts to gee a response
their] une 1 1, 1998, letter co INS officials detailing a number of
concerns abour Krome. The recent resignation of Kristine Marcy,
Senior Counsel for Detention and Deportation in the Office of Field
to
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Operations, who worked diligently to improve conditions at Krome,
further jeopardizes major changes underway. 27

It is not only the immigrants who have complained about the
inhumane treatment at the detention centers, but even international
organizations, such as Amnesty International, have been concerned by
the situation at the detention facilities. As citizens, we enjoy our
American freedom and many of the blessings of this land. Does the
benefit we derive from such strict immigration laws, policies, and
practices exceed the misery caused co its victims? lllegal immigration
cannot be condoned, bur we muse not perpetrate such injustice.
Unfortunately, the anguish of immigrants does nor end there.
As rhe Krome facilities fell short, INS has started transferring
detainees to Florida county jails. INS detainees are classified as
maximLUn security prisoners and do not have access ro many benefits
many other criminal prisoners do. INS detainees cannot join work
release program or become crustees. 38 Also, detention in county jails
prevents INS detainees from obtaining proper legal representation. 2~
The detainees in county jails, generally, do not have access to legal
materials ro help them become aware of the immigration laws. ~ In the
fall of 1998, the detainees at the Port Manatee Central Jail in Palmetto,
Florida, filed a complaint against their jailers, alleging that they "were
beaten, stripped naked, dragged through dog and human waste and left
for 20 hours in flooded cells. "31 Even though these claims may seem
exaggerated, the INS did acknowledge that some of those complaints
were valid. The validity of even one of these complaints is a shameful
mark against the honor of the United States.
INS officials admit that they do not have the capacity to detain all
the persons the new laws require them to detain. 32 INS claims that they
would need around 21,000 additional beds, 1,500 extra employees and
$652 million dollars more tO do what Congress requires. 33
It is ironic chat the United Stares, which has acted as an international watchdog for human rights violations, is itself abusing human
rights. The Reform Act's consequences weaken the posidon of the
United States to voice its concerns on international human rights
violations. The United States is party to the United Nations' 1967
Protocol on rhe Status of Refugees,.~• the Covenanr on Civil and
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Political Rlghts,3s and Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatrnem or Punishment.~
One of rhe fundamental obligations of these international treaties
is non-refoulement, which requires that a country not return a refugee
to his home country if the refugee would be persecuted or killed upon
return. Hence, asylum seekers must demonstrate "that it is more likely
than not" that they would face persecution upon returning to their
country.r Immigrants given withholding of removal from the United
States, only because removing them would violate the Torture convention, stiJI have co face mandatory detention.38 In such cases those immigrants might be better off to return to their home country and live in
the fear of possible persecution, rather than live in the certainty of
prison. Non-refoulement is further risked because of the Reform Act's
"expedited removal" requirement. The "expedited removal" process and
lack of judicial review make it possible for asylum-seekers with a
genuine need and sincere intent to be denied asylum. They may not be
given enough time and legal support to establish the genuineness of
their claim.
Another problem with the Reform Act is the diffusion of responsibility berween the three branches of the Government. None of
the branches is willing ro assume consummate responsibility for the
consequences of the Act, yet each has the power to rectifY the Reform
Act's weaknesses." Separation of powers was inherently designed by the
Constitution to ensure accountability. If any branch feels that an act
severely punishes the immigrants, it can make an effort to reduce the
severity on immigrants. Congress can pass laws ro give the courts a
proper and just direction to follow in immigration matters. Similarly,
the courts can strike down any part of a legislative act chat they feel
violates any part of the U.S. Constitution. However, this has yet to
happen.
A recent example in which the court did not use its power to stop
INS from an unlawful act is the Elian Gonzalez case. Like many
Cubans, thirteen people, including Elian and his mother, left Cuba on
a sea journey with the hope of making it ro Miami. However, their
dreams of living in America never materialized, as their boat capsized,
leaving only three survivors. One of the survivors was the six-year-old
Elian, who was rescued on 25 November 1999 by the U.S. Coast
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Guard. The intense battle chen starred berween Elian's Miami relatives,
who wanted him ro stay in the United Stares, and the government, who
wanted Elian to be returned to the rightful guardian, his father. While
the government demanded custody of the boy, Ellan's relatives were not
willing to let him go. On 22 April, 2000, INS agents stormed into the
Miami relatives' residence and took Elian away at gunpoint.
The INS decision to return Ellin to his father, recognizing that the
father is the legal guardian in the absence of the mother, does make
sense. However, when £NS came to the relative.s' home, they had a
warrant issued by a federal magistrate judge, obtained pursuant to Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."0 Such a warrant can be
issued only for a federal crime. However, the government never argued
that Eliin or his relatives had committed a federal crime. In recent
years Rule 41 bas been used to warrant searches in which a person is
physically restrained, such as kidnapped victims. 41 But this was not the
case with Eliin. Elian did nor qualify as kidnapped under the Federal
law, in which the victim is "willfully transported in interstate or foreign
commerce."H Keeping Elian after the legal custody ended did not
make Elian a kidnapped victim. The fact that the court allowed such a
warrant when it had no legal foundation illustrates that there are times
when the court turns a blind eye on many lNS injustices. Action taken
by any of the branches of government could have stopped or even
prevented this injustice from occurring; however, as we see from the
Elian case, the government allowed the INS policies to have priority
over justice.
Another direct consequence of the Reform Act has been an increase
in costs, both in the private sector as well as the public. Stephen
Legomsky has very eloquently summed up the human costs of
detention in his article "The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and
Discretion" in the following words:
By definition, detention is a deprivation of liberty. Detainees cannot
work, cannot go co school, cannot meaningfully socialize, cannot
travel beyond the bounds of their facilities, and are cut off from
family and friends. Of course, the deprivation is muruaJ. Family
members and friends similarly lose the benefits of the detainee's
companionship. t )
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If the detainee is an asylum-seeker, chen it sometimes defeats the
purpose of her seeking asylum if she ends up losing her freedom in
detencion centers. It is for chis reason that the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees strongly d.iscourages detaining asylum seekers. 44 Lawful permanent residents, if they had not been
detained would have been able to work. By being detained, they and
their families suffer economic losses.
Detention also creates huge economic costs on caxpayers. Firstly, by
detaining persons who were legally aJiowed ro work in the United
States, the government loses cax revenue. Add.itionally, the government
has to spend approximately $66 per person in detention costs.•, American taxpayer money is being used to finance detention, which many
might view to be a breach of the American ideals of liberry. Many
taxpayers may not want their money to be used ro restrict the liberty of
others, whom they do not deem guilty.
The responsibility to bring greater justice to INS detainees rests
with Congress, the INS, and the courrs ...6 The legislative branch can
amend the Act so as strengthen the constitutionality of the Act's
policies of expedited removal, mandatory detention, and limited
judicial review.•· Congress can also define limitations to the interpretations of the Act (for example, it could prevent the retroactive
application of the Act in cases of deportable crimes).
There are a number of ways in which INS could improve itself
regarding the Reform Act. INS must look for alternatives to detention.
While detention may be necessary for certain immigrants, it wiU be to
INS's benefit to reduce the size of the detained population. INS could
collaborate with voluntary relief agencies to assist asylum-seekers with
no criminal record .... This would save INS huge costs as well as prevent
unjust detention of innocent people. But then INS might risk rdeasing
people who are likely to abscond. So the best solution is co evaluate
each case individually, rather chan crying to fit each asylum applicant
inro some category.
Furthermore, the INS should stop using local prisons co detain
asylum-seekers and criminal immigrants. INS detainees have different
needs and loc."ll facilities are inadequately prepared ro meet those needs.
Detainees in local prisons have no access to legal materials and it is
difficult for immigration attorneys co reach their clients. The basic legal
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needs of women and children should be met. Women should be
provided with proper medical attention and female hygiene products .....
Every effort should be made to prevent child custody, particularly
because children are more vulnerable to the traumatic detention
experience. If those children are, at some Iacer time, able to stay in the
United States as free citizens, they may never de\·elop love and patriotism
for this country. If it becomes a matter of absolute necessity to detain
children, then high priority should be given to children's educational and
recreational needs. The practice of prison uniform for juveniles should be
discontinued.
The detrimental effects of the two Acts discussed in this article
warrant a change in the current immigration policies. We must modifY
our policies to be more compliant with the United States' high standard
of human rights. As shown through the example of young Elian
Gonzalez, the government could have then and should take steps to
reform the unjust practices and policies of the INS. Although, the
courts have a limited role in formulating immigration policies, they can
ensure that there is a just application of the Reform Act to individual
cases. The courts still have the power to strike out any part of the Act
which it feels ro be unconstitutional, like the expedited removal policy
of the Act that radically opposes the due process clause of the United
States Constitution.
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IN THE BEST INTEREST
OF EuAN:
LIBERTY O R LIFE
BROCK LYLE

The decision by the INS to deny Elidn, an unaccompanied minor,
an adult right to asylum was completely jttstified and folly
within the ®main ofits authority.

A

mother, in an attempt to free herself and her son from an
oppressive regime tries to escape to a land of liberty. On the
way, the ship capsizes and only the young boy survives,
drifting at sea until he is finally rescued by passing fishermen. After the
rescue of six-year-old Elian Gonzalez, a political tug-of-war ensues. His
case, a landmark in many branches of the law, matched Clinton against
Castro, Reno against Rodriguez, and freedom against the family.
Despite the conflict, the decision by the INS to deny Elian, an
unaccompanied minor, an adult right to asylum was completely
justified and fully within the domain of its authority.

The INS
Two separate entities, combined to form the Immigration Senrice
and the Naturalization Service, on June 10, 1933, as the result of
Executive Order 6166. Its new purpose was to regulate the massive
immigration into the United States by establishing a codified difference
between legal and illegal aliens. In order to do this, it was given
authority by the Executive Branch to create new policies for situations
not covered by existing statutes. By 1952, Congress had amended the
U.S. Code to include a definition of asylum. As this term has been
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interpreted · in the courts since in inception, Black's Law Dictionary
defines it as "a sancruary, or place of refuge and protection."• Aliens
may apply for asylum in the United States if tbey bave a well-founded
fear of persecution in their home country. Due to this broad definicion,
"any alien ... may apply for asylum. "z In 1966, as a result of the vast
number of Cuban refugees fleeing Fidel Castro's communist regime,
the United States enacted the Cuban Adjustment Act. This provision
aUows Cubans to obtain residency in the U.S., regardless of whether
they arrived by a Legal port of entry, as long as they could prove that
they had lived in the U.S. for over a year.' This legislation still remains
in force.

The Elian Gonzalez Story
Elian Gonzalez was born in December 1993 near Havana, Cuba,
to Juan Miguel and Elizabeth Gonzalez, who separated when Elian was
three years old. Elizabeth retained custody of the boy; but Juan Miguel
had regular and substantial contact with him. On November 22, 1999,
Elizabeth, with Eli:in by her side, and with twelve other nationals, fled
C uba for the United States. The small boat capsized off the Florida
coast in stormy seas killing everyone aboard except Elhin and two
ochers. Two days later local fishermen found Elian clinging co an inner
tube. After treating Eli:in for dehydration at a Fort Lauderdale hospital,
the INS paroled Eli:in inco the custody of his great-uncle Lazaro, a
Miami resident.~
Lazaro filed two asylum applications in behalf of Elian and had the
boy sign a third application himsel£5 When the INS contacted Eli:in's
father, Juan Miguel, he denied Lazaro's authority to speak for his son
and demanded Eli:in immediate return to Cuba. As time went on and
Juan Miguel's demand went unmet, the media accumulated outside the
Elian's relatives' home in droves turning what should have been a small
family squabble into an international press war. The nation suddenly
had quite a problem on its hands: Do we return this boy to his father as
basic laws of cusrody would dictate, or do we grant him asylum because
of his mother's sacrifice to help him escape communist Cuba? This
question would be decided in the courtroom.
Lazaro's attorneys first went in front of Judge Rosa Rodriguez of the
Miami-Dade County Circuit Court, who ruled that Eliin's application
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for asylum must be considered. However, because Lazaro's attorneys had
helped Judge Rodriguez in her election campaign, many considered this
ruling dubious. The INS appealed to Attorney General Janet Reno, who
sidestepped Judge Rodriguez's ruling. Meanwhile, Juan lvliguel felt that
his demands were not being met and arrived in the United States to
pick up Elian, all the while under the watchful eye of Casrro.6
Attorney General Reno set several deadlines by which the Miami
family was ordered to render Elian, all of which were ignored. As a
result of mass media coverage, a small army of demonstrators had
convened around Lazaro Gonzalez's Miami residence threatening to not
allow the boy to be taken. Early in the morning of April 22, 2000,
federal agents in SWAT uniforms, armed with automatic weapons, and
a warrant from a federal magistrate judge, raided the Gonzalez house
and retrieved Eliin. He was subsequently reunited with his father and
returned to Cuba.'
Opposition: Free Elia.n!
The Gonzalez family's lawyers sought to establish a distinct reason
by which asylum would be necessary. As defined earlier in 8 USC
l158(a), asylum is gramed if there is a "well-founded fear" of persecution in the applicant's home country. Gonzalez's lawyers were quick to
point out that it was Fidel Castro and not Juan Miguel who first
demanded the boy's return. 8 Casrro, they pointed out, was already
wearing a lapel pin with Eliin's picture on it, turning him into a symbol
for communism. He was watching Elian more closely than other
Cubans, which further restricted Eliin's freedom. The lawyers claimed
that the Cuban Communist Parry's scrutiny constituted persecution.
Eliin would be denied rhe freedoms he would enjoy as an American,
especiaJly due to the high visibility and symbolic importance he had
attained in Cuba. In a terrible twist of fate, America would send the son
back to the regime his mother died trying to escape.
Lawyers for the Miami relatives also pointed our the various
procedural illegalities committed by che INS in the Gonzalez case. The
INS was criticized for failing to assign a guardian ad litem to the underage plaintiff a.~ required by recent federal law. The legality of the raid
and the warrant were also attacked. While a minor's parole to relatives
living in the U.S. is legal, "immigration officials failed to realize the
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potencial legal and political implications when they released Elian co
a great-uncle living in Miami."'' The subsequent raid on the Gonzalez
home in April was based on a warrant issued by a federal judge, but the
legality of the warrant was somewhat suspicious. It had been issued
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
neither Elian nor his Miami relatives had ever been charged with any
federal crime necessitating such a warrant. As demonstrated by Blackie's
House of Beef v. Castillo (1981), the INS could not legally perform a
search under criminal law unless a federal crime had been committed.
However, INS had the authority co do so under their general jurisdiction over illegal aliens. Had chis justification been used to obtain che
warrant, the raid would have been entirely legal. 11 The question of
the legality of Eli:in's ensuing return to Cuba is of primary importance
here.
To criticize the raid, lawyers based arguments on the fundamental
right of privacy, exclaiming rhings like, "Imagine the government
having enough power to forcefuUy break inro the home of a private
citizen who is guilty of no crime!" The INS was also criticized for
implementing a hascily formed new policy, written in the week between
January 3 and 12, 2000, that was considered in court under the
auspices of Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council. This
case required the court ro first inquire as to whether Congress has
direccly spoken about the issue at hand; if not, the court must respect
the agency's interpretation of the srarute. In the Elian case, the hastily
written INS interpretacion was given Chevron deference. 11

The INS: In Its O wn Defense
The INS repeatedly indicated that there was nothing on the books
even resembling the Elicin case. Since they could not depend on the law
to teU them how to proceed, the INS used government-given authority
co create a new policy. The Circuit Court ruled that "because the preexisting law compelled no particular policy, che INS was encided to
make a policy decision.... As a matter of law, it is not for the courtS,
but for the executive agency charged with enforcing the statute [here
the INS] to choose how co fill such gaps."12 They also claimed that the
basic law of parental custody held precedence over things like policies
and ideology. In response to the charge of failing to supply a guardian
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ad litem, the INS responded that such a counsel is unnecessary when
rhe child has a "next friend" or guardian. This is how Lazaro Gonzalez
described himself in the case presented to the courts.
While remaining silent abour the warrant, the INS held that the
raid was a necessity to end a situation char was becoming increasingly
detrimental to the child. The situation was not only harmful because
Elian was being kept from his nuclear family, but also because the
intrusion into Elian's life due to the intense media coverage. The
Attorney General had tried to negotiate with Elian's Miami relatives on
numerous occasions by setting several deadlines to hand over the boy;
however, each deadline was ignored. The INS claims the Miami
relatives left them no choice. They also explain that the raid was not
nearly as horrifying as the media portrayed it. They were merely
retrieving a child from a home where he was being held in order to
reunite him with his father.
The Court also ruled in favor of the INS decision to deny asylum.
Judge J. L. Edmonson wrote the opinion that the Court could not state
that "the foundation of the policy-the INS determination that sixyear-old children necessarily lack sufficient capacity to assert, on their
own, an asylum claim- is unreasonable."u When the Miami relatives
claimed due process rights, the Court referred to one of its own
opinions from 1984: "Aliens seeking admission to the United States ...
have no constitutional rights with regard to their applications." 14 Their
ruling as to the Chevron deference was, while contested, entirely legal.
Although the Court did not seem to agree with the INS, it did agree
that the decision and consequendy the action raken by the INS was
"within the ourside border of reasonable choices. "15
The distinction was made between Elian's legal ability to file for
asylum and the question of whether he had acrually done so.
The important legaJ question in this case, therefore, is not whether
the Plaintiff may apply for asylum; that a six-year-old is eligible to
apply for asylum is dear. The ultimate inquiry, instead, is whether a
six- year-old child has applied for asylum within the meaning of the
stacute when he, or a non-parental relative on hjs behalf. signs and
submits a purported application against the express wishes of the
child's parent. 16
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In the opinion of the Court, Elian did not actually file for asylum
because he was an extremely young and easily influenced minor. He
also did not have the mental capacity to comprehend his situation and
was therefore unable to decide on his own. This deferred the decision
to his legal guardian, his father. His father had expressed wishes to the
contrary. As for the qualifications for asylum, the Court ruled that
political conditions "which affect the populace as a whole or in large
part are generally insufficient to establish [persecution). We cannot say
that the INS had to treat education and indoctrination as synonymous
with 'persecution."' The Court ruled in favor of the INS and sent little
Elian home. 17

Conclusion
Although the INS was sharply criticized for the way that it handled
the Elian Gonzalez case, its actions were legal. Under the auspices
of the authority accorded it by the Executive Branch, the INS could
create a new policy to deal with a situation where the existing statute
did not apply. Though the media spun and hyped this story as much as
a summer blockbuster, the Eleventh Circuit Court validated the
judgment of the INS in the Gonzalez case and reunited Elian with his
father.
Appropriately, the INS did nor alJow public sentiment on Cuba's
politics or ideologies co cloud irs judgment. Legally, Elian must be
permitted him to live with his nearest legal guardian, his father,
wherever that may be. The support and normalcy Elian wiU receive in
his family will make up for any rights lost by becoming a citizen of the
United States. The INS decision to return to his father may not have
been an easy one, but it is the right decision.
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THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON FAMILY LIFE
RYAN JUDEN

Somt rkcisions made by the Supreme Court could
appear to rkst.abiliu the independence of
and respect for families.

T

he Declaration of Independence states that all citizens have an
unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
The Founding Fathers framed that document in order to
protect people from heavy-handed governmental infringement in their
Lives. Later when the Constitution was written and ratified, it outlined
exactly what restrictions government entities must accept when legislating about citizen choices. The underlying assumption in the documents
developed during America's infancy was that citizens have the righr
to form and govern their own families. According co Dr. Mark E.
Brandon, political science professor at the University of Michigan,
"There is evidence that the creators of the Constitution imagined that
the family would play an important role in preserving the republican
forms of politics that the Constitution entrenched."1 While Brandon
argues that the Constitution should preserve the f.unily, some decisions
made by the Supreme Court could appear to destabilize the independence of and respect for families.
A century ago, i.n Murphy v. Ramsey, 2 the Court said that the twoparent family is "the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in
our civilization; the best guaranty of d1at reverent minority which is the
source of all social and political improvement." Professor Robert A
Burt stated that the Court still approves of "the paternalistic, authoritarian family of the Amish community," but «other kinds of families,
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welfare families, non-marital families and informal groupings and
communal arrangements char perform some of the functions of the
fiunilies do nor receive the same kind of judicial imprimatur. "3
The Founding Fathers were influenced by Aristotle's views on
government and family when they framed the Constitution. Aristotle
asserted that the family was formed first and subsequently formed the
government for assistance. This would suggest that government should
be subordinate to the family rather than preeminent over it. As a result,
the Constitution places the family above governmem, reserving rhe
right co step inro the family arena only when absolucely necessary for
the health and safety of the individuals there. Aristotle said, "Hence it
is eviden c chat the State is a creation of [the family] ."•
Although the Constitution does not directly define or answer
questions regarding the family, it implies that the family has the basic
privileges of life, liberty, and property, as mentioned in First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. These rights, which are
referred co in many court cases as the ufundamental right of family
integrity,"S show that the Framers assumed that the families and those
char headed them had responsibility for the choices of the group as well
as rhe individuals within it.
When cases dealing with family issues have been granted certiorari
by the Supreme Court, the principle of judicial review has been
applied. Because the Constitution states char none «shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens," it is important that the process of deciding how cases are
determined needs to respect that mandate. "Limits on government
were built into the Bill of Rights in order ro make the Constitution
palatable to voting citizens who bad lived with copious government
intrusion in their lives. The Due Process clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment provided heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty incerescs."b This
amendment provides protection from certain kinds of government
intervention, both federal and state.
As the Court uses of judicial review ro evaluate their jurisdiction
and decisions, they refer to decisions of the past. It is conceivable chat
the rights of families could be seriously altered in the future because of
the decisions thar are currently being made in chat realm. That is why it
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is imperative that citizens be active in monitoring decisions made by
the Court. It is necessary chat they actively participate in the legislative
process. That way legislative processes can determine family policy in
the United Scates, not judicial activism. Judicial activism of rhe last
half-century shows how easHy the law of the land could be altered.
The Supreme Court has the responsibilicy of deciding ultimately
what rhe Constitution means and how its succinct statements of
fundamental law are to be applied to ever-cl1anging situations. For
this reason, the meaning of the Constitudon is subject co change
because the members of the Coun change over the years and because
ideas or policies considered acceptable in one era are unacceptable in
another time.In recent decisions some of rhe Justices on che Court have admitted
char irs power co use the Constitution as the basis for ruling specifically
in family decisions is ambiguous. Justice Antonio Scalia claimed char he
was disturbed that the Court is overstepping irs bounds by propagating
decisions on family issues. He wrote a dissenting opinion in Troxel v.
GranviUe stating, "[The Supreme Court is] ushering in a new regime of
judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law." His concern
addressed "judicial vindication of parent rights under [a] Constitution
that does not even mention rhem." 8 Despite the Court's apparent
uncertainty of its jurisdiction in regard co families, it is consistently
ruling in cases that influence them.
There are several cases in which the Court assumed jurisdiction
and ruled in ways chat had major impacts on society. One of the first
major decisions in the family arena in the last fifty years was Griswold
v. Connecticut. This case deale with a state policy chat prohibited the
availability of certain types of contraception co individuals. The Court
found chat the State did not have the right co regulate contraceptives,
citing that the Constitution provides for a certain degree of privacy.
While the Court championed the family right to privacy in deciding
Griswold, chis case broadened judicial review in an area previously
avoided.
In Roe v. Wade' the Court took the next and largest step coward
altering previous assumptions abour the family. The Coun legalized the
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accessibility of first trimester abortions to all and later abortions to
rhose whose doctors claimed their life would be in danger if they
remained pregnant. This outcome met with mixed public opinion at
the cime. 10 This decision was not only paramount in increasing government involvement in family policy, but it redefined the Court's earlier
definicion of the f.unily given by Jusrice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut: "Marriage is the coming together, for better or for worse,
hopefuUy enduring, and inti mare to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, a harmony in living, and a
bilateralloyalty." 11
In addition, Roe v. Wade stated chat a mother did not need to
inform the father of her child before obtaining an abortion. Eva Rubin
points out, "When abortion is available, the decision TO have an
abortion is likely to evoke conflicts and opposing interests within
the family structure.''!! Ruling that a father has no legal voice in the
decision to abort has serious implications for the "harmony of living"
or "bilateral loyalty" in marriage. Conversely it promotes conflict,
opposing interests, and instability. Granted, those who are choosing to
obtain abortions are not always married nor do they always have
partners who intend to establish a family with the mother of their
child. However, for those who are married, this decision shifted the
parental paradigm by making che decision to abort between the mother
and doctor, excluding the father. Therefore, the Court undermined its
own definition of ..a two-parent family as a sure foundation of a stable
society."
Another effect of Roe v. Wade, intended by the Court or not, is the
implicit discouragement for people to form stable, enduring families.
Rubin agrees with this statement by stating, "By separating sex from its
normal consequences, [they] discourage family formation. " 11 This
decision not only affects the family directly, but it affects the traditional
reinforcements of the family, such as religion and community, that have
historically promoted and protected the American family.
There has always been a unique relationship between the family,
community, and religion. For most people, religion is a supportive
institution that helps co strengthen the family. In Doe v. Santa Fe
Independent School District, the Court ruled against public prayer at
football games. 14 The impact of this decision confines the use of
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religion in ways that were traditional at the time of the birth of our
nation. Although the Court accepts the principle that God gives us
unalienable rights contained in the Constitution, the Court denies that
the Creator should be thanked and honored for these rights in public
and in prayer. Mauro and Ringel claim thar this decision blasts a hole
in separation of church and state." Another impact of it is that it
severely limits the use of religion and principles taught at church that
parents depend upon in order to strengthen their families. 1 ~
In the case of the Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
Court voted
in a narrow 5-4 decision that States could not force Boy Scouts to
accept homosexuals as leaders of young men. 16 Since this case was
decided by a split vote, it is likely that there could be future challenges
on this case. The Boy Scout program provides an environment in
which young men are taught morality along with basic skiJis and
patriotism. The Scout Oath includes the principle of morality. Through
campouts, merit badges, community service projects, and other
activities, Scouts make friends and learn together how co live in ways
that reinforce traditional values. Although Scouting programs are nor
perfect, their goal is to help children learn how to become future
leaders in society.
In Troxel v. Granville, previously discussed, the Court ruled 6-3
that the Washington State law stating that "any person who requested
visitation had a right to visit children" violated fundamental parental
rights. Troxel sought a guarantee that grandparents would have the right
to visit their grandchildren, even if that was against the wishes of the
parents. '- "The Court ruled that grandparents are not included in
the nuclear family and are therefore not entitled to visitation rights." 18
This is an issue of family independence. The decision in Troxel v.
Granville verifies parental rights to determine what happens to their
children. By accepting this case, the Court expressed a willingness to
adjudicate within family law. Others have a dim view of that judicial
oversight. Governor John Engler of Michigan wrote, "It is essential rhat
Washington acknowledge the limits of government. It has never been,
nor will it ever be, a subsrirute for the family." '"
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in the
Troxel case. She stated, "The demographic changes of the :past cenrury
make ic difficult to speak of an average F.unily."::o She also wrote, "There
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wiU normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family. "~• In another case, Justice O'Connor contradicted
chat statement by conceding, "The Court as a federal entity has rhe
right to inject itself in the family.''u However, there are very few reasons
for the government to inject itself into the f.uniJy, including decisions
regarding parent's fundamental right ro make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and <::onrrol of their children as long as basic care and
concern are exhibited.
Current trends suggest that the Court will conrinue ro exercise
judicial authority over rhe family. As a result, government policies
regarding the family may be determined judicially racher than legislativeJy. Future cases with impaCts on family policy char are scheduled to
be cried the Supreme Court include marriage between members of the
same gender, aborrion pills, and partial birth abortion. In my opinion,
the Court should exercise greater restraint when ruling on cases that
affect the family. They should respect the traditional family pattern
char has created centuries of stability in civilizations and uphold the
assumptions of the Founding Fathers.
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